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Abstract 
Many microeconometric models of discrete labour supply include alternative-specific constants meant 
to account for (possibly besides other factors) the density or accessibility of particular types of jobs 
(e.g. part-time jobs vs. full-time jobs). The most common use of these models is the simulation of tax-
transfer reforms. The simulation is usually interpreted as a comparative statics exercise, i.e. the 
comparison of different equilibria induced by different policy regimes. The simulation procedure, 
however, typically keeps fixed the estimated alternative-specific constants. In this note we argue that 
this procedure is not consistent with the comparative statics interpretation. Since the constants reflect 
the number of jobs and since the number of people willing to work changes as a response to the 
change in tax-transfer regime, the new equilibrium induced by the reform implies that the constants 
should also change. A structural interpretation of the alternative-specific constants leads to the 
development of a simulation procedure consistent with the comparative statics interpretation. The 
procedure is illustrated with a simulation of alternative reforms of the income support policies in Italy. 
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1. Introduction 
A common practice in the specification of models of labour supply based on the discrete 
choice approach consists of introducing alternative-specific constants, which should account 
for a number of factors such as the different density or accessibility of different types of jobs, 
search or fixed costs and systematic utility components otherwise not accounted for. In the 
basic framework, the household chooses among H+1 alternatives or “job” types j = 0, 1,…,H, 
with j = 0 denoting non-participation (a “non-market job”). Let ( , ; , )i ijV i j w T ε+  denote the 
utility attained by household i if a job of type j is chosen, given wage rate iw and tax-transfer 
regime T, where ( , ; , )iV i j w T is the systematic part (containing observed variables) of the 
utility function and ijε  is a random component. Depending on the application and the 
available data, the job types might be defined in terms of one or many of the following 
attributes: weekly hours of work, sector of employment, occupational level type of contract 
etc. By assuming that ijε is i.i.d. Type I extreme value, we get the familiar Multinomial Logit 
expression for the probability that a job of type j is chosen by household i: 
 
{ }
{ }
exp ( , ; , )( , ; , )
exp ( , ; , )
i
i
k
V i j w T
P i j w T
V i k w T
=
∑
 (1) 
Model (1) usually does not fit the data very well. For example Van Soest (1995) notes that the 
model over-predicts the number of people working part-time. More generally, certain types of 
jobs might differ according to a number of systematic factors that are not accounted for by the 
observed variables contained in V: (a) availability or density of job-types; (b) fixed costs; (c) 
search costs; (d) systematic utility components. What might be called the “dummies 
refinement” is a simple way to account for those factors. Let us define subsets { }Sℓ  of the set 
of job types 0, 1,…, H and the corresponding indicator functions { }( )D j S∈ ℓ  such that
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( ) 1D e =  if and only if e is true. Clearly the definition of the subsets should reflect some 
hypothesis upon the differences among the job types with respect to the factors (a) – (b) 
mentioned above. Now we specify the choice probability as follows 
 
0
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ℓ ℓ
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 (2) 
Many papers – although with differing focus and motivation – have adopted a similar 
procedure, e.g.: Van Soest (1995), Aaberge et al. (1995, 1999), Kalb (2000), Dagsvik et al. 
(2006), Kornstad et al. (2007) and Colombino et al. (2010); see also the survey by Creedy and 
Kalb (2005).  
Expression (2) can be interpreted as embodying the assumption that certain jobs, beyond 
the contributions attributable to the observed characteristics, bring a systematic additive utility 
contribution, due to a number of unobserved systematic factors including their accessibility. 
More generally, the systematic unobserved contributions could be entered in a non-additive 
forms or could be measured in terms of income rather than utility. For example, another 
common procedure consists of subtracting from the income term (in the utility function) a 
parameter (usually called “participation cost” or “fixed cost of working”) whenever the job is 
a “market job”. In what follows, we will refer to the formulation of expression (2); however 
the analysis we propose is equally relevant for other formulation such as the fixed-cost 
approach.   
The main use of microeconometric models of labour supply consists of the simulation of 
tax-transfer reforms. The standard simulation proceeds as follows. Once V( ) and the{ }µℓ  are 
estimated, the current tax regime T is replaced by a “reform” R and a new distribution of 
choices is simulated using expression (2). All the authors adopting the “dummies refinement” 
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so far have performed the simulations by leaving the { }µℓ  unchanged. The policy simulation 
is most commonly interpreted as a comparative statics exercise, where different equilibria – 
induced by different tax-transfer regimes – are compared. In this note we claim that the 
standard procedure in general is not consistent with the comparative statics interpretation. 
According to a basic notion of equilibrium, the number of people willing to work must be 
equal to the number of available jobs. Since the { }µℓ  reflect – at least in part, depending on 
the interpretations – the number and the composition of available jobs, and since the number 
of people willing to work and their distribution across different job types in general change as 
a consequence of the reforms, it follows that in general the { }µℓ  must also change. Building 
on a matching model developed by Dagsvik (1994, 2000), the basic random utility approach 
can be extended to include random choice sets and provide a structural interpretation of the 
“dummies refinement” that leads very naturally to a simulation procedure consistent with 
comparative statics.1  
The procedure is explained in Sections 2, 3 and 4. Section 5 illustrates an empirical 
example. Section 6 contains the conclusions. 
  
                                                           
1
 A different procedure for equilibrium simulation – which however would not be appropriate for the 
class of microeconometric models considered here – has been proposed by Creedy and Duncan 
(2005).  
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2. A structural interpretation of the “dummies refinement” 
We consider here a single individual. The generalization to couples is developed in Section 4. 
Building on Dagsvik (1994), a series of papers (among others: Aaberge et al. 1995, Aaberge 
et al. 1999, Dagsvik and Strøm 2006, Aaberge and Colombino 2012a and 2012b) adopt an 
approach where there are “many” jobs that belong to each type j and a particular job z of type 
j produces a utility level  ( , ; , ) ( )i ijV i j w T zε+ , so that  ( , ; , )i ijV i j w T ε+  is to be interpreted as 
follows:   
 ( , ; , ) max ( , ; , ) ( ).i ij z i ijV i j w T V i j w T zε ε+ = +  (3) 
We let jg denote the number of available jobs of type j. The term jg can be interpreted as 
reflecting the demand side. In general it might be both job-specific and individual-specific but 
for simplicity of exposition we treat it here as common to all individuals. By assuming that ijε
is i.i.d. Type I extreme value, the probability that individual i is matched to a job of type j 
turns out to be: 
 
{ }
{ }
0
exp ( , ; , )( , ; , )
exp ( , ; , )
i j
i H
i k
k
V i j w T g
P i j w T
V i k w T g
=
=
∑
 (4) 
Dagsvik (2000) shows that expression (4) can be derived as a special case of a model where 
the agents (firms and workers) play a game leading to stable matching equilibrium (e.g. the 
deferred acceptance game).  
By defining 
1
M
k
k
J g
=
=∑ = total number of available market jobs, 0 0J J g= and j jg g J=ɶ , 
expression (4) can be rewritten as follows: 
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 (5) 
If we specify 
 ( )
0 0exp( )
exp  k k
J
g
δ
γ µ
=
=ɶ
 (6) 
we get a “dummy refinement” representation of the choice probability: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
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i t
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i H H
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µ µ
µ µ
=
= =
  
+ > + = 
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∑ ∑
 (7) 
 
where 0 0lnµ γ δ≡ + . Notice that we drop D(t = 1) since we set t = 1 as a reference type. 
Expression (6) specifies a very general form of the conditional densities 1 2, ,..., Mg g gɶ ɶ ɶ . In 
empirical applications we are usually interested in much more specific forms, for example a 
uniform distribution with “peaks”: 
 
( )exp  if , 1,...,
 otherwisek
k S L
g
γ µ
γ
∈ =
= 

ℓ ℓ
ℓ
ɶ
 (8) 
 where 1,... LS S are L disjoint subsets of the job-type indexes 1, 2, …, H. In this case we end 
up with: 
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ℓ
 (9) 
The dummies’ coefficients have therefore the following interpretation: 
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 0
0
ln J
g
µ
γ
 
=  
 
 (10) 
 ln ( )
J J
n S
µ
γ
 
=  
 
ℓ
ℓ
ℓ
 (11) 
where  
( )n S
ℓ
= number of type in , 2,...,S L=
ℓ
ℓ .  
The presence of factors other than jobs density (e.g. unobserved systematic costs or benefits 
specific of different job types) is not incompatible with expressions (10) and (11): more 
generally 0gγ and ( )n S γℓ might be interpreted as normalizing constants that include the effect 
of those other factors. Note that 0g and γ can be retrieved using expressions (10) - (11) and 
the observed values of J , J
ℓ
 and ( ), 1,...,n S L=
ℓ
ℓ . 
 
3. Equilibrium conditions 
For simplicity of exposition in this section we assume that , 1,...,kg k Hγ= =ɶ , so that the 
model contains only the dummy D : 
 
( ){ }
( ){ }
0
0
0
exp ( , ; , ) 0( , ; , ) .
exp ( , ; , ) 0
i
i H
i
k
V i j w T D j
P i j w T
V i k w T D k
µ
µ
=
+ >
=
+ >∑
 (12) 
Let us assume that the number of available jobs J depends on the moments ϑ of the wage 
distribution. In what follows we will refer interchangeably to ϑ as to the moments or to the 
distribution defined by those moments:
 
 
( ).J J ϑ=
 (13) 
For simplicity we assume here and in the empirical exercise of Section 5 that that equilibrium 
wage distribution is such that the number of market jobs and the number of people willing to 
work are equal, while the number worked hours accommodate the households’ preferences. 
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The framework can be easily extended to the case where both the number of jobs and the 
number of hours are allocated through the mechanism of equilibrium wages.  With ( )i Rw ϑ we 
will denote the wage rate of individual i in the equilibrium wage distribution induced by tax-
transfer regime R. 
It is important to distinguish the case of elastic labour demand from the limit cases of 
perfectly inelastic and perfectly elastic labour demand. 
Elastic demand 
Using (10) and (13) we can write: 
 0 0( )µ µ ϑ=  (14) 
We then define 0( , , ( ))i T TTpi ϑ µ ϑ as the probability that individual i is working given the tax-
transfer regime T and the wage distributionϑ : 
 
{ }
{ }
0
0
1
0
0
exp ( , ; ( ), ) ( ) ( 0)( , , ( ))
exp ( , ; ( ), ) ( ) ( 0)
H
i T T
i T T M
j
i T T
k
V i j w T D j
T
V i k w T D k
ϑ µ ϑ
pi ϑ µ ϑ
ϑ µ ϑ=
=
+ >
≡
+ >
∑
∑
 (15) 
where ( )i Tw ϑ is the wage rate of individual i given the wage distribution Tϑ . Assuming that 
the observed (or simulated) choices under the current tax-transfer regime T correspond to an 
equilibrium, we must have: 
 0( , , ( )) ( )i T T T
i
T Jpi ϑ µ ϑ ϑ=∑ . (16) 
In a comparative statics perspective, an analogous condition must hold under the “reform” R:  
 0( , , ( )) ( )i R R R
i
R Jpi ϑ µ ϑ ϑ=∑  (17) 
where Rϑ  denotes the new equilibrium wage distribution.  
Perfectly elastic demand 
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When the demand for labour is perfectly elastic, the market is always in equilibrium at the 
initial wage rate. However, since the number of working people in general will change under 
a new tax-transfer rule and since the number of jobs in equilibrium must be equal to the 
number of people willing to work, it follows that the parameter 0
0
ln J
g
µ
γ
 
=  
 
must change. 
Let us rewrite expression (10) as 00J g eµγ= . Then the equilibrium condition can be written as 
follows:
  
 
0
0 0( , , ) .Ri T R
i
R g eµpi ϑ µ γ=∑  (18) 
In this case the distribution ϑ remains fixed. Instead 0Rµ must be directly adjusted so as to 
fulfil condition(18). The case with fixed wage distribution and demand absorbing any change 
in supply actually corresponds to the scenario implicitly assumed in most tax-transfer 
simulations: however those simulations do not take condition (18) into account.
  
Perfectly inelastic demand 
In the special case of a perfectly inelastic demand (zero elasticity), the number of jobs 
remains fixed but the wage rate must be adjusted so that the number of people willing to work 
under the new regime is equal to the (fixed) number of jobs: 
 0( , , ( )) ( )i R R T
i
R Jpi ϑ µ ϑ ϑ=∑  (19) 
The implementation of the equilibrium procedure requires to specify how J and wi 
depend on ϑ. In principle, given appropriate identification conditions (for example with panel 
data) and a suitable empirical specification for ( )J ϑ , it might be possible to estimate it by 
substituting 0
0
( )ln J
g
ϑµ
γ
 
=  
 
 into the choice probabilities (12).
  
In the empirical example of 
Section 5, for illustrative purposes we will adopt the simple assumption that J depends on the 
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mean of the wage distribution according to a constant-elasticity relationship such as J K ηω −=
, where ω is the mean of the wage rate distribution, -η is the elasticity of labour demand and K 
is a constant. Individual wage rates are shifted together with the mean ω and maintain the 
same rank position in the distribution. We will perform a sort of sensitivity-analysis by 
imputing alternative values to the elasticity of labour demand.  
 
4. Extensions 
The basic framework illustrated above can be extended in many directions. 
4.1. Non uniform density of market jobs 
As in expression (8), we might want to specify a non-uniform conditional density for the 
market jobs. Let us consider again a single person. In this case we write ( )J J ϑ= and 
( ), 1,..., ,J J Lϑ= =
ℓ ℓ
ℓ which implies the relationships 0 0( )µ µ ϑ= and ( )µ µ ϑ=ℓ ℓ . 
We then define the probability that individual i is matched to a market job of type j S∈
ℓ
as 
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0 2
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pi ϑ µ ϑ µ ϑ µ ϑ
ϑ µ ϑ µ ϑ
ϑ µ ϑ µ ϑ∈
=
=
≡
+ +
≡
+ > + ∈
∑
∑ ∑ℓ
ℓ
 (20) 
with 1 0µ = . The probability that individual i is matched to a market job is  
 ( ) ( )0 2 0 2
1
, , ( ), ( )..., ( ) , , ( ), ( )..., ( )
L
i T T T L T i T T T L TT Tpi ϑ µ ϑ µ ϑ µ ϑ pi ϑ µ ϑ µ ϑ µ ϑ
=
≡ ∑ ℓ
ℓ
. (21) 
The equilibrium conditions for a reform R are respectively: 
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=
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 (22) 
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with elastic demand; 
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with perfectly elastic demand and 
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=
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∑
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 (24) 
with perfectly inelastic demand. 
4.2. Couples 
When analyzing the simultaneous labour supply decisions of married couples we might want 
to distinguish the choice set available to males (M) and females (F). The previous notation 
and the choice probabilities are generalized accordingly: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0
, 2
0
0 , 2
exp ( , , ; , , ) 0
( , , ; ) .
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F M iF iM x x x x x
x F M
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k x F M
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ℓ ℓ
ℓ
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 (25) 
For x = F or M, expression (10) is generalized as follows: 
 0
0
ln , ln , 2,..., .( )
x x x
x x x
x x
J J J L
g n S
µ µ
γ γ
   
= = =   
   
ℓ
ℓ
ℓ
ℓ  (26) 
We then specify gender-specific labour demand functions: 
 ( )x xJ J ϑ=  (27) 
 ( ), 2,...,x x xJ J Lϑ= =ℓ ℓ ℓ  (28) 
where ϑ now denotes the moments of the joint distribution of the partners’ wage rates.   
Expressions (26), (27) and (28) imply mappings such as: 
 0 0 ( ), ( ), 2,..., .x x x x xLµ µ ϑ µ µ ϑ= = =ℓ ℓ ℓ  (29) 
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Let us define ( )0 0 2 2, , ( ), ( ), ( )..., ( ), ( )..., ( )ix T F T M T F T LF T M T LM TTpi ϑ µ ϑ µ ϑ µ ϑ µ ϑ µ ϑ µ ϑℓ as the 
probability that the partner of gender x in couple i is matched to a job x xj S∈ ℓ , given the 
(current) tax-transfer regime T. Then  
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 (30) 
is the probability that partner of gender x in couple i is matched to a market job. 
Then the equilibrium conditions are 
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for the case with elasticity demand;  
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for the case with perfectly elastic demand and 
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for the case with perfectly inelastic demand. 
4.3 Matching equilibrium  
The matching model developed by Dagsvik (2000) replaces the simple concept of equilibrium 
adopted in this note with the notion of stable matching. Our equilibrium is a special case of a 
13 
 
stable matching where the number of realized matches is equal to the number of available 
jobs and to the number of people willing to work. More generally, however, we can have a 
stable matching that involves vacancies and unemployment.  
4.4 Changes in non-market opportunities 
So far we have treated g0 (defined in Section 2) as a constant. It might be argued that when 
reaching a new equilibrium, also g0 might change. For example it might be the case that 
market jobs provide also goods and services that are complements or substitutes to non-
market activities: thus changes in the number of market jobs might induce a change in g0. If 
we make the (very special) assumptions that g0 varies in the same proportion as J and if 
labour demand if perfectly elastic, then we have a scenario where both the wage rate and µ0 
remain constant, thus providing an equilibrium interpretation of the standard simulation 
procedure. 
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5. An empirical illustration 
We illustrate the procedure presented above with a simulation of various hypothetical reforms 
of income support in Italy, using a microeconometric model of household labour supply. The 
model, the estimates, the policy motivations and the simulated reforms are fully described in 
Colombino (2011). Here we illustrate the main features of the model and some of the 
simulation results with the perspective of illustrating the implications of the equilibrium 
simulation. 
 
5.1. The model 
We consider households with two decision-makers (couples) or one decision-maker (singles). 
The choices of other people – if any – in the household are taken as exogenous.  
The choice probabilities for singles and couples are those of expressions (20) and (25) 
respectively.   
Each individual (single or partner in a couple) chooses among 11 job-types defined by weekly 
hours of work h: so h0 = 0 and 1 2 10, ,...,h h h are ten random values drawn from the intervals 1-8, 
9-16, 17-24, 25-32, 33-40, 41-48, 49-56, 57-64, 65-72, 73-80. 
For the systematic part of the utility function we adopt a quadratic specification, where C 
denotes household total net available income: 
  
2 2
2
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
C F F M M CC FF F
MM M CF M CM M FM F M
V C T h T h C T h
T h C T h C T h T h T h
θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ
= + − + − + + − +
+ − + − + − + − −
 (34) 
for couples and 
 
2 2( ) ( ) ( )C x x CC xx x Cx xV C T h C T h C T hθ θ θ θ θ= + − + + − + −  (35) 
for singles (x = F, M). 
Some of the above parameters θ are made dependent on characteristics: 
15 
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
2
0 1 2
3 4 5
2
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C C C
x x x x x
x x x F M
β
θ β β
θ β β β β
β β
+
= +
= + + + +
+ + =
 (36) 
In order to compute the value of C  for all the job-types we use the EUROMOD 
Microsimulation model. Wage rates for those who are observed as not employed are imputed 
on the basis of a wage equation estimated on the employed subsample and corrected for 
sample selection.  
For the estimation and simulation exercise we use a EUROMOD dataset produced 
from the 1998 Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW1998).2  
The data include couples and singles. Both partners of couple households and heads of 
single households are aged 20 – 55 and are wage employed, self-employed, unemployed or 
inactive (students and disabled are excluded). As a result we are left with 2955 couples, 366 
single females and 291 single males. 
The simulation exercise accounts for equilibrium between the total number of jobs and 
the number of people willing to work. The implicit (simplifying) assumption in the exercise is 
that, whilst the number of jobs and people willing to work are equated by the equilibrium 
wage distribution, the hours worked accommodate households’ preferences. For gender x = F, 
M we adopt the following empirical specification for expression (27): 
 
x x x
J K ηω −=  (37) 
                                                           
2
 More recent datasets are of course available. We chose to use a model that was already estimated on 
1998 data with the purpose of illustrating a methodological proposal. From the perspective of the 
policy simulations, pre-2001 data do not suffer from the turbulent macroeconomic scenarios that 
characterize the post-2001 years. 
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where 
x
ω  is the mean of the wage rates distribution, SK  is a constant and η−  is the elasticity 
of labour demand. Therefore: 
 0
0
( ) ln x xx x
x
K
g
ηωµ ω
γ
− 
=  
 
 (38) 
Given xJ  (observed or simulated under the current tax-transfer system), xω , the estimated 
0xµ  and an imputed value of η, we can use expressions (37) and (38) to retrieve 0xgγ  and xK . 
In this exercise we use η = 0, 0.5, 1, ∞.  
The equilibrium conditions derived in Section 4 are fulfilled by calibrating 
x
ω (i.e. 
shifting the location of the wage rate distributions) or directly 0xµ (when η = ∞) in the course 
of the simulation. 
 
5.2. The policies 
Current Italian income support policies can be classified as contingent interventions (such as 
unemployment benefits) and structural (or anti-poverty) interventions.  
There appear to be three main undesirable features of the design of contingent 
policies: (a) being they aimed at preserving the job rather than the worker’s income and 
opportunities,  the labour reallocation from unprofitable jobs to more promising ones is 
severely discouraged; (b) they are limited to certain sector and types of contract, thus 
generating social exclusion and processes of the insider-outsider type; (c) often some of the 
contingent interventions have to go through a bargaining process involving firms, unions and 
local or central authorities, thus adding more sources of potential inequities.  
The anti-poverty interventions are mainly aimed at supporting low pensions, disabled 
people and low-income families with a mean-tested transfer, which is however limited to 
wage employees. Embodied in the personal income taxation system there are also tax credits 
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and child benefits that can be classified as anti-poverty policies. It has been observed that the 
design of these policies creates distortions and bad incentives for labour market participations 
of married women (e.g. Colonna and Marcassa, 2011).  
Overall, many analysts have suggested that the current Italian system of income 
support policies is defective with respect to both efficiency goals (e.g. minimizing distortions 
and supporting labour mobility) and equity goals (e.g. reducing poverty and economic 
insecurity).3  
In this paper we consider various versions of hypothetical income support policies that 
– differently from the current policies described above – are universal, meaning that they are 
not conditional upon professional or occupational categories or on bargaining or contingent 
financial constraints. As it is typically the case with universal policies, they are financed by 
general taxes. These reforms are stylized cases representative of the different scenarios that 
are discussed or even actually implemented in many countries.  
In the following description of the policies there appears a “threshold” G that will be 
defined below.  
Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI). Each individual receives a transfer equal to G – I if 
single or G/2 – I if partner in a couple provided I < G (or I < G/2), where I denotes individual 
taxable income. This is the standard conditional (or means-tested) income support 
mechanism.  
                                                           
3
 See for example Onofri (1997), Baldini et al. (2002), Boeri and Perotti (2002) and Sacchi (2005). A 
first microeconometric evaluation of alternative reforms of the Italian tax-transfer system was done by 
Aaberge et al. 2004). In March 2012 the Italian Government has designed a reform of the income 
support policies, which at the moment is being discussed by the Parliament. The reform contains some 
steps toward universalism but so far it does not seem to change the basic characteristics of the current 
system.   
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Unconditional Basic Income (UBI). Each individual receives an unconditional transfer equal 
to G if single or G/2 if partner in a couple. It is the basic version of the system discussed for 
example by Van Parijs (1995) and also known in the policy debate as “citizen income” or 
“social dividend” (Meade 1995; Van Trier 1995). 
Wage Subsidy (WS). Each individual receives a 10% subsidy on the gross hourly wage and 
her/his income is not taxed as long as her/his gross income (including the subsidy) does not 
exceed G if single or G/2 if partner in a couple. This is close to various in-work benefits or 
tax-credits reforms introduced for example in the USA (Earned Income Tax Credit), in the 
UK (In-Work Benefits) and in Sweden.4 
GMI + WS and UBI + WS are mixed mechanisms where the transfer is coupled with the 
wage subsidy, but with the threshold redefined as 0.5G.5 
In order to define G, let us preliminary define 
C = total net available income (current) of the household: 
N = total number of components of household n. 
 C C N=ɶ  = “individual-equivalent” income. 
( )median 2P C= ɶ
 
= Poverty Line. 
Then: 
G aP N= ,6  
where [0,1]a ∈ . is a “coverage” rate, i.e. what proportion of the poverty line is covered by G. 
For each reform we simulate three versions with different values of a: 1, 0.75 and 0.50. For 
                                                           
4
 Many authors have recently analysed or suggested in-work-benefits policies for Italy (Colonna and 
Marcassa 2011, Figari 2011, De Luca et al. 2012)  
5
 A mixed system close to GMI+WS has been proposed in Italy by De Vincenti and Paladini (2009). 
6
  The “square root scale” is one of the equivalence scales commonly used in OECD publications. 
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example, G=0.5P 3  means that for a household with 3 components the threshold is ½ of the 
Poverty Line times the equivalence scale 3 . 
 The income support mechanism is matched with a progressive tax that replicates the 
current system but with marginal tax rates applied to the whole income exceeding G (or G/2) 
and proportionally adjusted according to a constant  (the parameter  is used in the 
simulation as a calibrating device in order to fulfil the public budget constraint). 
Altogether we have 5 (types) × 3 (values of a) = 15 reforms.  
Each reform defines a new budget constraint for each household. The simulation 
consists of running the model after replacing the current budget constraint with the reformed 
one. The parameter  (defined above) is endogenously determined so that the total net tax 
revenue is equal to the one collected under the current tax-transfer system (taking into account 
the households’ behavioural responses).  The equilibrium conditions are attained by 
iteratively calibrating the mean of the wage rate distribution: this will determine the number 
of available market jobs through expression (37) and the value of 0µ (expression (38)), which 
in turn will affect the number of people accepting a job (expression (38)). Besides the 15 
alternative reforms we also simulate a tax-transfer system – that we call “current” – with the 
same five alternative procedures used for the reforms: it is characterized by the same income 
support mechanism as in the true current system, but the tax rule is given a simplified 
representation as in the reforms: namely, we apply the marginal tax rates to the whole 
personal income. Therefore we compare what would happen with this system and with the 
reforms under the alternative equilibrium conditions. We think this procedure is preferable to 
the standard one consisting of comparing the observed status quo to the reforms.7 
                                                           
7
 The results reported in Colombino (2011) are in part different from the ones reported here since the current 
system is defined there as the observed status quo. 
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Five simulation procedures are adopted: one where the equilibrium conditions are 
ignored and four more where the equilibrium conditions are determined by 
0, 0.5, 1.0, .η = − − ∞
  
We evaluate the policies with a Social Welfare function defined as:  
(Average Individual Welfare) × (1 – Gini index of the distribution of Individual Welfare). 
This is similar to the so-called Sen Social Welfare index and it can be rationalized as a 
member of a rank-dependent social welfare indexes (e.g. Aaberge and Colombino 2012a, 
2012b). Individual Welfare is the money metric equivalent of the expected maximum utility 
(EMU). The EMU is the natural logarithm of the denominator of the choice probabilities. The 
money metric equivalent for household i is the level of income that makes the EMU of the 
reference household (we choose the worst-off one) equal to the EMU of household i (King 
1983). 
 
5.3. Results 
Tables 1 – 5 report some results of the five simulations  
The policies are ranked in descending order (best one at the top) according to the 
Social Welfare function defined in Section 5.2. The reforms are identified by the content of 
the first two columns: the income support mechanism (GMI etc.) and the coverage, i.e. the 
value of a (0.5, 0.75 or 1) defined in section 5.2. For example, (UBI+WS, 0.75) denotes a 
policy where the income support mechanism is UBI+WS and G is 75% of the Poverty line. 
For each reform we report three pieces of information related to behavioural effects 
(annual hours of work), distortions (top marginal tax rate) and distributive effects (poverty 
rate).   
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The different simulation procedures lead to notable differences in the results. The 
standard (no equilibrium) procedure seems to favour a more generous coverage: out of the 
five best policies of Table 1, two have a = 1, two have a = 0.75 and one has a = 0.5. In the 
other Tables the average coverage among the first five best policies is lower and it decreases 
with respect to η. The no equilibrium procedure favours also pure unconditional policies: 
three positions out of the first five of Table 1 are occupied by UBI policies. On the contrary, 
when we assume η = 0, three out of the first five policies are mean-tested (GMI). In the other 
cases, the results are more mixed, with some prevalence of UBI+WS policies. The current 
mechanism of income support is always ranked at the bottom, except when η = ∞. With 
increasing η, less generous policies – including the current one – move up in the ranking. This 
happens because a more elastic labour demand moderates the increase in equilibrium wages, 
which in turn implies higher equilibrium tax rates. In most cases the income effects induced 
by the reforms appear to work in opposite directions for females and males: the reforms 
induce more (less) hours worked by of women (men) when compared to the current system, 
the exception being again the simulation with η = ∞, where, under the three worst policies, 
women work fewer hours than under the current system.  
We have noted in Section 3 that the common practice of not accounting for the 
equilibrium adjustment of the wage rates is usually interpreted as a perfectly elastic demand 
scenario. This interpretation is not correct: indeed by comparing Table 1 and Table 5 we see 
that the simulation performed under the correctly specified scenario with perfectly elastic 
demand produces results that are radically different from those produced by the no-
equilibrium simulation.  
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6. Conclusions 
The standard simulation procedure adopted when using microeconometric models of labour 
supply for reform evaluation might not be consistent with an interpretation of the simulation 
results in terms of comparative statics, i.e. comparison of different equilibria. This happens 
when the model includes a representation of aspects of the pre-reform equilibrium (such as 
the availability of different types of jobs) that are going to change in the post-reform 
equilibrium and when this change is not properly accounted for. We have proposed a 
simulation method that takes into account such a change for a certain class of 
microeconometric models and leads to a consistent interpretation of the simulation results as 
an exercise in comparative statics. We have illustrated the relevance of the different 
simulation procedures with an evaluation of alternative reforms of the Italian income support 
policies. 
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Table 1. No equilibrium 
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Annual Average  
Hours 
of Work 
(Women) 
Annual Average  
Hours 
of Work 
(Men)  
Top Marginal 
Tax Rate (%) 
Head Count  
Poverty Ratio 
UBI+WS 1.00 999 2042 53.6 0.17 
UBI 0.75 991 2039 55.4 0.04 
UBI+WS 0.75 1004 2043 51.3 1.01 
UBI 0.50 1000 2042 50.9 0.52 
UBI 1.00 982 2036 59.9 0.00 
WS 1.00 1016 2046 48.2 3.38 
UBI+WS 0.50 1008 2045 49.5 2.44 
WS 0.75 1015 2046 47.3 3.67 
WS 0.50 1016 2047 46.8 4.11 
GMI+WS 1.00 1000 2043 50.9 1.43 
GMI+WS 0.75 1005 2044 49.1 2.34 
GMI+WS 0.50 1008 2045 47.7 3.26 
GMI 0.50 1000 2044 45.9 2.36 
GMI 1.00 983 2039 51.3 0.01 
GMI 0.75 992 2042 48.2 0.87 
Current 945 2063 43.7 4.33 
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Table 2. Equilibrium with η = 0. 
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Annual Average  
Hours 
of Work 
(Women) 
Annual Average  
Hours 
of Work 
(Men)  
Top Marginal 
Tax Rate (%) 
Head Count  
Poverty Ratio 
GMI 1 1005 2046 48.2 0.26 
GMI 0.75 1009 2047 45.7 1.32 
UBI 0.5 1009 2044 50.0 0.62 
GMI 0.5 1013 2048 44.9 2.95 
UBI+WS 0.5 1014 2048 48.9 2.64 
UBI+WS 0.75 1010 2046 49.9 1.00 
UBI+WS 1 1005 2044 52.3 0.24 
GMI+WS 1 1010 2046 49.7 1.03 
UBI 0.75 996 2040 54.7 0.06 
GMI+WS 0.75 1010 2046 48.0 2.42 
GMI+WS 0.5 1014 2047 47.4 3.41 
WS 0.5 1016 2047 46.8 4.15 
WS 1 1017 2047 48.0 2.99 
WS 0.75 1014 2047 46.9 3.63 
UBI 1 971 2032 62.0 0.00 
Current 945 2063 43.7 4.33 
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Table 3. Equilibrium with η = 0.5. 
In
co
m
e 
Su
pp
o
rt
 
M
ec
ha
n
is
m
 
Co
ve
ra
ge
 
Annual Average  
Hours 
of Work 
(Women) 
Annual Average  
Hours 
of Work 
(Men)  
Top Marginal 
Tax Rate (%) 
Head Count  
Poverty Ratio 
UBI+WS 0.75 1009 2044 50.2 0.95 
UBI+WS 0.5 1013 2046 49.2 2.52 
WS 0.75 1020 2047 46.5 3.65 
WS 0.5 1019 2047 46.6 4.14 
GMI+WS 0.5 1012 2046 47.7 3.40 
GMI+WS 0.75 1009 2045 48.3 2.38 
WS 1 1019 2046 47.9 3.04 
UBI 0.5 1002 2042 50.9 0.52 
UBI 0.75 993 2038 55.3 0.04 
UBI+WS 1 1004 2040 53.0 0.18 
UBI 1 984 2035 59.8 0.00 
GMI 0.5 1005 2045 45.8 2.48 
GMI 0.75 996 2043 47.3 0.81 
GMI+WS 1 1004 2043 50.7 0.79 
GMI 1 986 2040 50.9 0.00 
Current 945 2063 43.7 4.33 
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Table 4. Equilibrium with η = 1.0. 
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Annual Average  
Hours 
of Work 
(Women) 
Annual Average  
Hours 
of Work 
(Men)  
Top Marginal 
Tax Rate (%) 
Head Count  
Poverty Ratio 
UBI+WS 0.75 1011 2043 50.2 0.95 
UBI+WS 0.5 1014 2045 49.2 2.52 
WS 0.75 1021 2046 46.5 3.66 
WS 0.5 1021 2047 46.6 4.14 
GMI+WS 0.5 1013 2046 47.6 3.40 
GMI+WS 0.75 1010 2045 48.3 2.38 
WS 1 1020 2046 47.9 3.04 
UBI 0.5 1003 2041 50.8 0.52 
UBI 0.75 994 2038 55.2 0.04 
UBI+WS 1 1005 2040 52.9 0.20 
UBI 1 985 2034 59.7 0.00 
GMI 0.5 1005 2044 45.7 2.48 
GMI+WS 1 1005 2043 50.6 0.79 
GMI 0.75 997 2042 47.2 0.81 
GMI 1 988 2039 51.1 0.01 
Current 945 2063 43.7 4.33 
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Table 5. Equilibrium with η =∞. 
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Annual Average  
Hours 
of Work 
(Women) 
Annual Average  
Hours 
of Work 
(Men)  
Top Marginal 
Tax Rate (%) 
Head Count  
Poverty Ratio 
UBI+WS 0.5 982 2044 49.3 2.53 
GMI+WS 0.5 981 2045 47.7 3.31 
WS 0.5 985 2046 46.6 4.16 
UBI 0.5 969 2040 50.9 0.46 
GMI 0.5 971 2043 45.9 2.44 
Current 914 2062 43.7 4.42 
UBI+WS 0.75 948 2040 50.4 0.85 
GMI+WS 0.75 947 2042 48.6 2.19 
WS 0.75 953 2044 46.6 3.64 
UBI 0.75 928 2035 55.5 0.02 
GMI 0.75 931 2039 47.7 0.72 
UBI+WS 1 912 2036 53.3 0.05 
WS 1 922 2041 48.1 2.95 
GMI+WS 1 911 2038 51.2 0.73 
UBI 1 888 2030 60.3 0.00 
GMI 1 890 2034 52.1 0.00 
